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Abstract—Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) infiltrate cy-
ber systems and compromise specifically targeted data and/or
resources through a sequence of stealthy attacks consisting of
multiple stages. Dynamic information flow tracking has been
proposed to detect APTs. In this paper, we develop a dynamic
information flow tracking game for resource-efficient detection
of APTs via multi-stage dynamic games. The game evolves
on an information flow graph, whose nodes are processes and
objects (e.g. file, network end points) in the system and the
edges capture the interaction between different processes and
objects. Each stage of the game has pre-specified targets which
are characterized by a set of nodes of the graph and the goal
of the APT is to evade detection and reach a target node
of that stage. The goal of the defender is to maximize the
detection probability while minimizing performance overhead on
the system. The resource costs of the players are different and
information structure is asymmetric resulting in a nonzero-sum
imperfect information game. We first calculate the best responses
of the players and characterize the set of Nash equilibria for
single stage attacks. Subsequently, we provide a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute a correlated equilibrium for the
multi-stage attack case. Finally, we experiment our model and
algorithms on real-world nation state attack data obtained from
Refinable Attack Investigation system.
Index Terms—Multi-stage attacks, Multi-stage dynamic game,
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), Information flow tracking
1. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are long-term stealthy
attacks mounted by intelligent and resourceful adversaries
with the goal of sabotaging critical infrastructures and/or exfil-
trating critical information. Typically, APTs target companies
and organizations that deal with high-value information and
intellectual property. APTs monitor the system for long time
and perform tailored attacks that consist of multiple stages.
In the first stage of the attack, APTs start with an initial
reconnaissance step followed by an initial compromise. Once
the attacker establishes a foothold in the system, the attacker
tries to elevate the privileges in the subsequent stages and
proceed to the target through more internal compromises. The
attacker then performs data exfiltration at an ultra-low-rate.
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Detecting APTs is a challenging task as these attacks
are stealthy and customized. However, APTs introduce in-
formation flows, as data-flow and control- flow commands,
while interacting with the system. Dynamic Information Flow
Tracking (DIFT) is a promising detection mechanism against
APTs as DIFT detects adversaries in a system by tracking
the traces of the information flows introduced in the system
[1]. DIFT taints or tags sensitive information flows across the
system as suspicious and tracks the propagation of tagged
flows through the system and generates security analysis
referred as traps, which are based on certain pre-specified
security rules, for any unauthorized usage of tagged data [2].
Our objective in this paper is to obtain a resource-efficient
analytical model of DIFT to detect multi-stage APTs by an
optimal tagging and trapping procedure. There is an inherent
trade-off between the effectiveness of DIFT and the resource
costs incurred due to memory overhead for tagging and track-
ing non-adversarial information flows. Adversarial interaction
makes game theory a promising framework to characterize
this trade-off and develop an optimal DIFT defense, which is
the contribution of this paper. Each stage of the APT attack is
a stage in our multi-stage game model which is characterized
by a unique set of critical locations and critical infrastructures
of the system, referred to as destinations. Note that, the
intermediate stages in the attack hold critical information to
the adversary for achieving its goals in the final stage.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We model the interaction of APTs and DIFT with the
system as a two-player multi-stage nonzero-sum game with
imperfect information structure. The adversary strategizes
in each stage of the game to reach a destination node of
that specific stage and the defender strategizes to detect
the APT in a resource-efficient manner. A solution to
this game gives an optimal policy for DIFT that performs
selective tagging that minimize both overtagging and un-
dertagging, a tag propagation rule with tag sanitization, and
an optimal selection of security rules and trap locations to
conduct security analysis to maximize the probability of
APT detection while minimizing memory and performance
overhead on the system.
• We provide algorithms to compute best responses of the
adversary and the defender. The best response of the
adversary is obtained by reducing it to a shortest path
problem on a directed graph such that a shortest path gives
a sequence of transitions of the attacker that has maximum
probability of reaching the final target. The best response
of the defender, which is a subset of nodes, is obtained by
using the submodularity property of its payoff function.
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• We consider a special case of the problem where the attack
is a single-stage attack. For this case, we characterize the
set of Nash equilibrium of the game. This characterization
is obtained by proving the equivalence of the sequential
game to a suitably defined bimatrix-game formulation.
• We provide a polynomial-time iterative algorithm to com-
pute a correlated equilibrium of the game for the multi-
stage attack. The correlated equilibrium provide an algo-
rithm to obtain locally optimal equilibrium strategies for
both the players by transforming the two-player game to
an N(M+2)+ |Λ|+1-player game, where N denotes the
number of processes and objects in the system, M denotes
the number of stages of the APT attack, and |Λ| denotes
the cardinality of the set of security rules.
• We perform experimental analysis of our model on the
real-world multi-stage attack data obtained using Refinable
Attack INvestigation (RAIN) framework [3], [4] for a three
day nation state attack.
Related Work
There are different architectures for DIFT available in the
literature to prevent a wide range of attacks [5]. The funda-
mental concepts in these architectures remain same, however,
they differ in the choice of tagging units, tag propagation
rules: data- and control-flow dependencies based rules, and
the set of security rules used for verification of the authenticity
of the information flows [9]. Table I gives a brief overview of
the different DIFT architectures used in some representative
papers. While the papers in Table I gave software modeling of
DIFT architecture, we provide an analytical model of DIFT.
Specifically, we model DIFT to detect APTs by tracking
information flows using data-flow dependencies.
Game theory has been widely used in the literature to
analyse and design security in cyber systems against different
types of adversaries [10], [11]. For instance, the FlipIt game
modeled in [12] captures the interaction between APTs and
the defender when both the players are trying to take control
of a cyber system. In [12], both APT and defender take
actions periodically and pay a cost for each of their action.
Lee et al. in [13] introduced a control-theoretic approach to
model competing malwares in FlipIt game. Game models are
available for APT attacks in cloud storage [14] and cyber
systems [15]. Interaction between an APT and a defender
that allocate Central Processing Units (CPUs) over multiple
storage devices in a cloud storage system is formulated as
a Colonel Blotto (zero-sum) game in [14]. Another zero-sum
game model is given in [15] to model the competition between
the APT and the defender in a cyber system.
Often in practice, the resource costs for the defender and the
adversary are not the same, hence the game model is nonzero-
sum. In this direction, a nonzero-sum game model is given in
[16] to capture the interplay between the defender, the APT
attacker, and the insiders for joint attacks. The approach in
[16] models the incursion stage of the APT attack, while our
model in this paper captures the different stages of an APT
attack. More precisely, we provide a multi-stage game model
that detect APTs by implementing a data-flow-based DIFT
detection mechanism while minimizing resource costs.
A DIFT-based game model for single-stage attack is given
in the recent work [17]. Later, [18] extended the model in [17]
to the case of multi-stage attack. The approaches in [17] and
[18] consider a DIFT architecture in which the locations in
the system to perform security analysis, called as traps or tag
sinks, are pre-specified and the defender will select the data
channels that are to be tagged. In this paper, we provide an
analytical model for data-flow based DIFT architecture that
select not only the data channels to be tagged but also the
locations to conduct security analysis and also the security
rules that are to be verified. The proposed model, hence
captures a general model of data-flow based DIFT.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the preliminaries of DIFT and the system. Section 3
introduces the notations used in the paper and then presents
the game formulation. Section 4 discusses the solution concept
for the game we consider. Section 6 presents a solution
approach to the game for the single-stage attack. Section 7
presents a solution to the game for the multi-stage attack.
Section 8 explains the experimental results of the model
and results on real-world data. Finally, Section 9 gives the
concluding remarks.
2. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss the detection mechanism DIFT
and the graphical representation of the system referred to as
information flow graph.
A. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
DIFT detection system has three major components: 1) tag
sources, 2) tag propagation rules, and 3) tag sinks or traps.
Tag is a single or multiple bit marking, depending on the
level of granularity, that denotes the sensitivity of a data
flow. Data channels, such as keyboards, network interface,
and hard disks, are considered as sensitive and hence tagged
by DIFT when it holds information that could be exploited by
an APT [7]. All information flows emanating from a tagged
channel are tagged flows. The tag status of the information
flows propagate through the system based on the pre-specified
propagation rules which are either data-flow-based or data-
and control-flow-based. Hence, whenever a tagged flow mixes
with a benign flow, the resulting flow gets tagged [5].
Tagged flows are inspected at specific locations called tag
sinks also referred as traps in order to determine the runtime
behavior of the system. Tag sinks are specified either using the
memory and code locations (like tag sources) or using types
of instructions where the users want to analyze a tagged flow
before executing certain types of instructions [5]. Tag sinks
are generated in the system when an unusual usage of a tagged
information is detected. The system then obtains the details
of the associated flow, like terminal points of the flow, the
path traversed, and concludes if the flow is spurious or not
based on the system’s or program’s security rules. In case if
the system concludes that the flow is spurious, it terminates
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Table I: An overview of the DIFT architectures for data-flow and control-flow based tracking for different choices of tag
sources and security analyses
Reference
DIFT
Tag source and Tag propagation Security analysis
Newsome et al.
[1]
• inputs from network sockets
• data-flow-based
attacks altering jump targets, format string attacks, attacks
using system call arguments, and attacks targeted at specific
libraries
Clause et al. [5] • data from network hosts
• data- and control-flow-based
each instance of call, return, or branch instruction
Suh et al. [2] • all I/O except initial program
• data-flow-based
use of tainted data as load addresses, store addresses, jump
targets, and branch conditions
Yin et al. [6] • text, password, HTTP, ICMP,
FTP, document, and directory
• data-flow-based
anomalous information access, anomalous information leakage,
and excessive information access
Vogt et al. [7] • all inputs specified by Netscape
• data-flow-based
whenever tainted data is transferred to a third party
Dalton et al. [8] • every word of memory
• data-flow-based
high level semantic attacks, memory corruption, low-overhead
security exceptions
the system operation. On the other hand, if the flow is found
to be not spurious, then the system continues its operation.
Conventional DIFT will tag all the sensitive channels in
the system. This, however, results in tagging of numerous
authentic flows referred as overtagging [9] which leads to
false alarms and performance overhead resulting in system
slowdown. On the other hand, untagged spurious flows due
to undertagging are security threats to the system. Moreover,
conventional DIFT only adds tag and never removes tag
leading to tag spread [9]. To reduce tag spread and the
overhead caused by tagging, the notion of tag sanitization
was introduced in [9]. The output of constant operations
(where the output is independent of the source data) and a
tagged flow successfully passing all security rules can be
untagged. An efficient tagging policy must incorporate tag
sanitization and perform selective tagging in such a way that
both overtagging and undertagging are minimized. Also, the
selection of security rules and the locations of the tag sinks
must be optimal to reduce performance and memory overhead
on the system.
B. Information Flow Graph
Information flow graph G = (VG ,EG) is a graphical repre-
sentation of the system in which the node set VG = {s1, . . . ,sN}
corresponds to the processes, objects, and files in the system
and edge set EG ⊆ VG ×VG represents interactions between
different nodes. More precisely, the edges of the graph repre-
sent information flows captured using system log data of the
system, for the whole-system execution and workflow during
the entire period of logging. The node set D ⊂ VG denote
the subset of nodes that correspond to critical data centers
and the critical infrastructure sites of the system known as
destinations. We consider multi-stage attacks consisting of,
say M stages, where each stage is characterized by a unique
set of destinations. The set D j := {d j1, . . . ,d jn j} denotes the
set of destinations in the jth stage of the attack and hence
D := ∪Mj=1D j. The interaction of DIFT and APTs, which we
formally model in Section 3, evolves through G.
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION: GAME MODEL
In this section, we model a two player multi-stage game
between APTs and DIFT. We model the different stages of
the game in such a way that each stage of the APT attack
translates to a stage in the game.
A. System Model
We denote the adversarial player of the game by PA and
the defender player by PD. In the jth stage of the attack, the
objective of PA is to evade detection and reach a destination
node in stage j, given by D j. The objective of PD is to detect
PA before PA reaches a node in D j. In order to detect PA,
PD identifies a set of processes Y := {y1, . . . ,yh} ⊆VG as the
tag sources such that any information flow passing through a
process yi ∈ Y is marked as sensitive. PD tracks the traversal
of a tagged flow through the system and generates security
analysis at tag sinks denoted as T := {t1, . . . , th′} ⊂VG using
pre-specified rules.
Let Λ be the set of security rules. We consider security
policy that are based on the terminal points of the flow.
Therefore, Λ : VG ×VG → {0,1}, where 1 represents that the
pair of terminal points of the flow violate the security policy
of the system and 0 otherwise. Here, |Λ|6 N2, since not all
node pairs in VG have a directed path between them. Hence
the number of security rules that are relevant to a node is
atmost N. Without loss of generality, we assume that each
node in G is associated with N security rules. As N is large,
applying all N security rules at every tag sink is not often
required. In our game model, DIFT selects a subset of rules
at every tag sink to perform security analysis.
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B. State Space of the Game
Let λ ⊂ VG denote the subset of nodes in the information
flow graph that are susceptible (vulnerable) to attacks. In order
to characterize the entry point of the attack by a unique node,
we introduce a pseudo-process s0 such that s0 is connected
to all the processes in the set λ . Let S :=VG ∪{s0}, Eλ :=
{s0}×λ , and E := EG ∪Eλ . Note that, s0 is the root node of
the modified graph and hence transitions are allowed from s0
and no transition is allowed into s0.
Now we define the state space of the game. Each decision
point in the game is a state of the state space and is defined
by the source of the flow in set λ , the stage of the attack, the
current process si along with its tag status, trap status, and the
status of the N security rules applicable at si. We use s
j
i to de-
note the process si at the jth stage of the attack. Then the state
space of the game is denoted by S¯ := {VG×λ ×{1, . . . ,M}×
{0,1}2+N} ∪ {(s10, 0, . . . ,0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2+N times
)}, where S¯ = {s¯1, . . . , s¯T} with
T = (2(2+N)NM|λ |)+1. Here s¯1 = (s10,0, . . . ,0) is the state in
S¯ corresponding to the pseudo-node s0. The remaining states
are given by s¯i = (s
j
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
(2+N)
i ), for i= 2, . . . ,T , where
si ∈ VG , j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, λi ∈ {1, . . . , |λ |}, and k1i , . . . ,k2+Ni ∈
{0,1}. Here, k1i = 1 if si is tagged and k1i = 0 otherwise.
Similarly, k2i = 1 if si is a tag sink and k
2
i = 0 otherwise,
and k3i , . . . ,k
2+N
i denotes the selection of security rules (bit
1 denotes that a rule is selected and bit 0 denotes that the
rule is not selected). Note that S¯ has exponential cardinality.
Tagging s0 means tagging all sensitive flows which is not
desirable on account of the performance overhead. Therefore,
s0 is neither a tag source nor a tag sink and it is always in
stage 1 with origin at s0 itself as denoted by state s¯1. We give
the following definition for an adversarial flow in the state
space S¯ originating at the state (s10,0, . . . ,0).
Definition 3.1. An information flow in S¯ that originates at
state (s10,0, . . . ,0) and terminates at state (s
j
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i )
is said to satisfy the stage-constraint if the flow passes through
some destinations in D1,D2, . . . ,D j−1 in order.
C. Actions of the Players
The players PA and PD have finite action sets over the
state space S¯ denoted by sets AA and AD, respectively.
The action set of PA is a subset of VG and represents
the next node in G that is reached by the flow. PA can
also end the game by dropping the information flow at
any point of time by transitioning to a null state φ . Thus
AA = {s ji : si ∈S , j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}}∪{φ}. Note that, λi for a
state (s ji ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
(2+N)
i ) in S¯ is decided by the process in λ
to which the adversary transitions from s0, i.e., the transition
from (s0,0, . . . ,0) in the state space. Further, λi for a particular
adversarial flow remains fixed for all states in S¯ that the
flow traverses. As the tag propagation rules are pre-specified
by the user, the action set of PD includes selection of tag
sources, tag sinks, security check rules, and tag sanitization.
Hence the action set of defender at s ji is a binary tuple,
(k1i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ), and AD = {0,1}NM(2+N). While the objective
of PA is to exploit the vulnerable processes λ of the system to
successfully launch an attack, the objective of PD is to select
an optimal set of tagged nodes, say Y? ⊂ Y , and an optimal
set of tag sinks, say T ? ⊂ T , and a set of security rules such
that any spurious information flow in the system is detected
at some tag sink before reaching the destination.
D. Information of the Game
Both the adversary and the defender know the graph G.
At any state s¯i in the game, the defender has the information
about the tag source status of s¯i, the tag sink status of s¯i, and
the set of security rules chosen at s¯i. However, the adversary
is unaware of the tag source status, the tag sink status, and the
security rules chosen at that state. On the other hand, while
the adversary knows the stage of the attack, the defender does
not know the stage of the attack and hence the unique set of
destinations targeted by PA in that particular stage. Thus, the
players PA and PD have asymmetric knowledge resulting in
an imperfect information game.
E. Strategies of the Players
Now we define the strategies of both the players. A strategy
is a rule that the player uses to select actions at every step
of the game. Since the action sets of the players are lower
level processes with memory constraints and computational
limitations, we consider stationary strategies which are defined
below for both the players.
Definition 3.2. A player strategy is stationary if it depends
only on the current state.
Additionally, we consider mixed strategies and hence there
are probability distributions over the action sets AA and
AD. The defender strategy at a process si, pD(si) is a tuple
of length 2+N, (p1D(si), . . . ,p2+ND (si)), that consists of the
probability that si is tagged p1D(si), the probability that si is
a tag sink p2D(si), and the probability of selecting each rule
in Λ corresponding to si, (p3D(si), . . . ,p2+ND (si)). The pseudo-
process s0 has pi
′
D(s0) = 0 for i
′ ∈ {1, . . . ,2+N}. Note that
the defender strategy does not depend on the stage, as the
defender is unaware of the stage of the attack. The adversary
on the other hand knows the stage of the attack and hence
the strategy of PA, i.e., the transition probability distribution
pA :S ×{1, . . . ,M} → [0,1]AA , depends on the attack stage.
Consider a process si and let N (si) denotes the set of
neighbors of si defined as N (si) := {si′ : (si,si′) ∈ E}∪{φ}.
Then, pA(s ji ,s
j′
i′ ) 6= 0 implies that one of the following cases
hold: 1) j = j′ and si′ ∈ N (si), and 2) j′ = j + 1 and
si = si′ ∈ D j. Here, case 1) corresponds to transition in the
same stage to a neighbor node or dropping out of the game
and case 2) corresponds to transition at a destination from one
stage to the next stage. Note that, in case 2) (i.e., j′= j+1 and
si = si′ ∈ D j) pA(s ji ,s j+1i ) = 1. Also, ∑si′∈N (si)pA(s
j
i ,s
j′
i′ ) =
1. Taken together, the strategies of PA and PD are given
by the vectors pD = {(p1D(si), . . . ,p2+ND (si)) : si ∈ S } and
pA = {pA(s ji ,s j
′
i′ ) : si ∈S , j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and si′ ∈N (si)},
respectively. Note that, pA is a vector whose length equals
the number of edges in the state space S¯ , say ˆ|E |, while pD
vis a vector of length |S | with each entry of length 2+N.
Notice that pA is defined in such a way that a flow that
originate at (s10,0, . . . ,0) in the state space S¯ reaches a state
(s ji ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ), for some λi ∈ {1, . . . , |λ |} and for some
k1i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ∈ {0,1}, after passing through some destinations
of stages 1, . . . , j− 1. By this definition of state space and
strategies of the game, all information flows in S¯ satisfy
the stage-constraints, given in Definition 3.1, and can affect
the performance of the system and even result in system
breakdown, if malicious.
F. Payoffs to the Players
Now we define the payoff functions of the players PA
and PD, denoted by UA and UD, respectively. The payoff
function for both the players include penalties and rewards
at every stage of the attack. If the adversarial flow reaches a
destination in the jth stage satisfying the stage-constraint, then
the adversary earns an intermediate reward and the defender
incurs an intermediate penalty. On the other hand, if the
adversary gets detected at some stage j, then the adversary
incurs a penalty, the defender receives a reward, and the game
terminates. In addition to this, the defender is also associated
with costs for tagging the nodes, setting tag sinks at the
nodes, and selecting security rules from the set Λ, as tagging
and security analysis of information flows lead to resource
overhead such as memory and storage.
More precisely, UA consists of: (i) reward β Aj > 0 for
successfully reaching a destination in the jth stage satisfying
the stage-constraints, and (ii) cost αA < 0 if the adversary is
detected by the defender. Similarly, UD consists of: (a) mem-
ory cost CD(si)< 0 for tagging node si ∈VG , (b) memory cost
WD(si)< 0 for setting tag sink at node si ∈VG , (c) cost γi, for
i∈ {1, . . . ,N}, for selecting the ith security check rule at a tag
sink, (d) cost βDj < 0 if the adversary reaches a destination
in the jth stage satisfying the stage-constraint, and (e) reward
αD > 0 for detecting the adversary. We assume that the cost of
tagging a node and the cost of setting tag sink at a node, CD(si)
and WD(si), respectively, are independent of the attack stage.
However, CD(si) and WD(si) depends on the average traffic at
process si and hence CD(si) := c1 B(si) andWD(si) := c2 B(si).
Here, c1 ∈ R− is a fixed tagging cost and c2 ∈ R− is a fixed
cost for setting tag sink, where R− is the set of negative real
numbers, and B(si) denotes the average traffic at node si.
Recall that, the origin of any adversarial information flow
in the state space S¯ is (s10,0, . . . ,0). For a flow originating
at state (s10,0, . . . ,0) in S¯ , let pT ( j) denotes the probability
that the flow will get detected at stage j and pR( j) denotes
the probability that the flow will reach some destination in
set D j. Note that pT ( j) and pR( j) depends on the tag source
status, the tag sink status and also the set of security rules
selected. For a given strategy, pD and pA, the payoffs UD and
UA are given by,
UD(pD,pA) = ∑
si∈S
(
p1D(si)CD(si)+p2D(si)WD(si)+
N
∑
r=1
p2+rD (si)γr
)
+
M
∑
j=1
(
pT ( j)αD + pR( j)βDj
)
, (1)
UA(pD,pA) =
M
∑
j=1
(
pT ( j)αA + pR( j)β Aj
)
. (2)
G. Preliminary Analysis of the Model
In this subsection, we perform an initial analysis of our
model. A multi-stage attack consisting of M stages belongs
to one of the following M+2 scenarios.
1) The adversary drops out of the game before reaching some
destination in D1.
2) The adversary reaches some destination each in D1, . . . ,D j
and then drops out of the game, for j= 1, . . . ,M−1 (M−1
possibilities).
3) The adversary reaches some destination each in
D1, . . . ,DM .
4) The defender detects the adversary at some stage.
The utility of the game is different for each of the cases
listed above. In scenario 1), PA and PD incurs zero pay-
off. In scenario 2), adversary earns rewards for reaching
stages 1, . . . , j, respectively, defender incurs penalty for not
detecting the adversary at stages 1, . . . , j, respectively, and the
game terminates. In scenario 3), the adversary earns rewards
for reaching destinations in all stages and wins the game
and the defender incurs a total penalty for not detecting the
adversary at all the stages. In the last scenario, adversary
incurs the penalty for getting detected and the defender earns
the reward for detecting the adversary and wins the game.
For calculating the payoffs of PD and PA at a decision point
in the game (i.e., at a state in S¯), we define utility functions
U A : S¯ → R and UD : S¯ → R for the adversary and defender,
respectively, at every state in the state space S¯ . Let q(s j′i )
denotes the probability with which the adversary drops out
of the game at state (s j
′
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ), for any λi ∈ λ and
k1i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ∈ {0,1}. Let PR, j(s j
′
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ) denotes the
probability that an information flow originating at (s10,0, . . . ,0)
reaches a destination in D j and then drops out before reaching
a destination in D j+1, without getting detected by the de-
fender, when the current state is (s j
′
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ). Also let
PT (s
j′
i ,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ) denote the probability that an information
flow is detected by the defender when the current state is
(s j
′
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ). To characterize the utility of the players
at a state in S¯ , we now introduce few notations. For notational
brevity, let us denote k1i , . . . ,k
2+N
i by k¯i, for i = 1, . . . ,N. For
state (s j
′
i ,λi, k¯i), define
Qr(s
j′
i ):= ∑
s`∈N (si)
kg`∈{0,1}
pA(s j
′
i ,s
r
`)
[2+N
∏
g=1
(
pgD(s`)
)kg`(1−pg
D
(s`)
)(1−kg` )]PR, j(sr`,λi, k¯`),
Qr(s
j′
i ):= ∑
s`∈N (si)
kg`∈{0,1}
pA(s j
′
i ,s
r
`)
[2+N
∏
g=1
(
pgD(s`)
)kg`(1−pg
D
(s`)
)(1−kg` )]PT (sr`,λi, k¯`).
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UD(s j′i ,λi, k¯i) = ∑
sb∈S
(
p1F,b(s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i)CD(sb)+ p2F,b(s j
′
i ,λi, k¯i)WD(sb)+
N
∑
r=1
p2+rF,b (s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i)γr
)
+
M
∑
j=1
(
pR, j(s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i)(
j
∑
v=1
βDv )+PT (s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i)α
D
)
, (3)
U A(s j′i ,λi, k¯i) =
M
∑
j=1
(
pR, j(s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i)(
j
∑
v=1
β Av )+PT (s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i)α
A
)
. (4)
Then,
PR, j(s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i) =

0, k1i = · · ·= k2+Ni = 1
q(s j
′
i )+Q j′+1(s
j′
i ), si ∈D j, j′ = j
0, si ∈D j′ , j′ = j+1
0, j′ > j+1
Q j′(s
j′
i ), j
′ ≤ j
q(s j
′
i )+Q j′(s
j′
i ), j
′ = j+1
PT (s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i) =

1, k1i = · · ·= k2+Ni = 1
0, j′ = M,si ∈DM
Q j′(s
j′
i ), otherwise.
Using the definitions of PR, j(·) and PT (·) at a state in
S¯ , the payoffs of the defender and the adversary at a state
(s j
′
i ,λi,k
1
i , . . . ,k
2+N
i ) is given by Eqs. (3) and (4) respectively.
In Eqs. (3) and (4), p1F,b(s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i) denotes the probability
that node sb ∈ VG is tagged in a flow whose current state
is (s j
′
i ,λi, k¯i) and p
2
F,b(s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i) denotes the probability that
node sb ∈ VG is a tag sink in a flow whose current state is
(s j
′
i ,λi, k¯i). Similarly, p
2+r
F,b (s
j′
i ,λi, k¯i) denotes the probability
that the rth security rule is selected for inspecting authenticity
of a flow whose current state is (s j
′
i ,λi, k¯i). Eqs. (3) and (4)
give a system of 2(2+N)NM|λ |+ 1 linear equations each for
the utility vectors UD and U A, where UA(b), UD(b) denote
the utilities at the bth state in S¯ . Now we give the following
result, which relates global payoffs UD,UA with local payoffs
UD,UA, respectively.
Lemma 3.3. Consider the defender and adversary strate-
gies pD and pA, respectively. Then, the following hold:
(i) UA(pD,pA) = UA(s10,0, . . . ,0), and (ii) UD(pD,pA) =
UD(s10,0, . . . ,0).
Proof. (i): By definition, U A(s10,0, . . . ,0) =
∑Mj=1
(
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)(∑
j
v=1β
A
v ) + PT (s
1
0,0, . . . ,0)α
A
)
.
Here,
M
∑
j=1
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)(
j
∑
v=1
β Av ) = β
A
1
M
∑
j=1
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)+
β A2
M
∑
j=2
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)+ . . .+β
A
M PR,M(s
1
0,0, . . . ,0), (5)
Where, ∑Mj=1 pR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0) is the total probability that a
flow originating at (s10,0, . . . ,0) reach some destination in D1.
Similarly, ∑Mj=2 pR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0) is the total probability that a
flow originating at (s10,0, . . . ,0) reach some destination in D2.
Thus
M
∑
j=1
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)= pR(1),
M
∑
j=2
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)= pR(2), . . . ,
PR,M(s10,0, . . . ,0) = pR(M). (6)
From Eqs. (5) and (6), we get
M
∑
j=1
(
PR, j(s10,0, . . . ,0)(
j
∑
v=1
β Av )
)
=
M
∑
j=1
pR( j)β Aj . (7)
Since PT (s10,0, . . . ,0) = ∑
M
j=1 pT ( j),
PT (s10,0, . . . ,0)α
A =
M
∑
j=1
pT ( j)αA. (8)
From Eqs. (7) and (8), we get U A(s10,0, . . . ,0) =
∑Mj=1
(
pR( j)β Aj + pT ( j)αA
)
=UA(pD,pA).
(ii): Notice that p1F,i(s10,0, . . . ,0) is the probability that
the process si is a tag source in a flow originating at
(s10,0, . . . ,0). Thus p
1
F,i(s
1
0,0, . . . ,0) = p
1
D(si). Similarly, we
get p2F,i(s
1
0,0, . . . ,0) = p
2
D(si) and p
2+r
F,i (s
1
0,0, . . . ,0) = p
2+r
D (si)
for r = 1, . . . ,N. This along with Eqs. (7) and (8) implies
that UD(s10,0, . . . ,0) = ∑si∈S
(
p1D(si)CD(si) + p2D(si)WD(si) +
∑Nr=1 p2+rD (si)γr
)
+∑Mj=1
(
pR( j)βDj + pT ( j)αD
)
=UD(pD,pA).
This completes the proof of (i) and (ii).
4. GAME MODEL: SOLUTION CONCEPT
This section presents an overview of the notions of equi-
librium considered in this work. We first describe the concept
of a player’s best response to a given mixed policy of an
opponent.
Definition 4.1. Let pA : {S ×{1, . . . ,M}} ∪ {s10} → [0,1]|Eˆ |
denote an adversary strategy (transition probabilities) and
pD : S → [0,1](2+N)|S | denote a defender strategy (probabili-
ties of tagging, tag sink selection, and security rule selection
at every node in the graph). The set of best responses of the
defender given by
BR(pA) = argmaxpD
{UD(pD,pA) : pD ∈ [0,1](2+N)|S |}.
Similarly, the best responses of the adversary are given by
BR(pD) = argmaxpA
{UA(pD,pA) : pA ∈ [0,1]|Eˆ |}.
Intuitively, the best responses of the defender are the set
of tagging strategies, the set of tag sink selection strategies,
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and the set of security rule selection strategies that jointly
maximize the defender’s utility for a given adversary strategy.
At the same time, the best responses of the adversary are the
sets of transition probabilities that maximize the adversary’s
utility for a given defender (tagging, tag sink selection, and
security rule selection) strategy. A mixed policy profile is a
Nash equilibrium (NE) if the mixed policy of each player is
a best response to the fixed mixed policy of the rest of the
players. Formal definition of Nash equilibrium is as follows.
Definition 4.2. A pair of mixed policies (pD,pA) is a Nash
equilibrium if
pD ∈ BR(pA) and pA ∈ BR(pD).
A Nash equilibrium captures the notion of a stable solution
as it occurs when neither player can improve its payoff by
unilaterally changing its strategy. Unilateral deviation of the
adversary’s strategy is a change in one of the transition
probabilities for fixed defender’s strategy and unilateral devi-
ation of the defender’s strategy is a change in either tagging
probability, or tag sink selection probability, or the probability
of selecting a security rule at a node, for fixed adversary
strategy. Kuhn’s equivalence result [19] between mixed and
stochastic policies along with Nash’s result in [20] that prove
the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) for a finite game
with mixed strategy, guarantees the existence of NE for the
game we consider in this paper. While there exists a Nash
equilibrium for games with rational, noncooperative players,
it is NP-hard to compute it in general, especially for nonzero-
sum dynamic games of the type considered in this paper. Also
note that, for the game considered in this paper, the utility
functions for the players are nonlinear in the probabilities. A
weaker solution concept which is a relaxation of the Nash
equilibrium is the correlated equilibrium defined as follows.
Definition 4.3. Let P denote a joint probability distribution
over the set of defender and adversary actions. The distribu-
tion P is a correlated equilibrium if for all strategies p′A and
p′D,
E(pD,pA)∼P(U
D(pD,pA)) ≥ E(p′D,pA)∼P(U
D(p′D,pA)
E(pD,pA)∼P(U
A(pD,pA)) ≥ E(pD,p′A)∼P(U
A(pD,p′A)
Here, E(·) denotes the expectation. We next consider a
simpler version of the correlated equilibrium that models the
local policies at each process.
Definition 4.4. Let P denote a joint probability distribution
over the set of defender and adversary actions. The distribu-
tion P is a local correlated equilibrium if for all states si ∈S ,
j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and strategies p′D(si) and p′A(s ji , ·), we have
E(pD,pA)∼P(U
D(pD,pA)) ≥ E(p′D,pA)∼P(U
D(p′D,pA)
E(pD,pA)∼P(U
A(pD,pA)) ≥ E(pD,p′A)∼P(U
A(pD,p′A)
where p′D denotes a strategy with p′
x
D(si) = p
′x
D(si), for some
x ∈ {1, . . . ,2+N}, p′yD(si) = pyD(si) for y ∈ {1, . . . ,2+N},y 6=
x, and p′D(si′) = pD(si′) for i 6= i′, and p′A denotes a strategy
with p′A(s
j
i , ·) = p′A(s ji , ·) and p′A(s j
′
i′ , ·) = pA(s j
′
i′ , ·) for (i, j) 6=
(i′, j′).
5. BEST RESPONSE OF THE PLAYERS
In this section, we calculate the best responses of both the
players, PA and PD.
A. Best Response for the Adversary
The best response of the adversary to a given defender
strategy is described here. Firstly, we present the following
preliminary lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Consider a defender policy pD. For each des-
tination d jb ∈ D j, let Ωd jb denote the set of paths in S¯
that originate at (s0,0, . . . ,0) and terminate at some state
that correspond to node d jb. For any path ω , let p(ω)
denote the probability that a flow reaches the destination
without getting detected by the adversary. Finally, for ev-
ery d jb, choose a path ω
∗
d jb
∈ argmax{p(ω) : ω ∈Ωd jb}. Let
ω∗ ∈ argmax{p(ωd jb) : d
j
b ∈D j, j = 1, . . . ,M}. Finally, define
the policy p∗A by
p∗A(s
j
i ,s
j′
i′ ) =
{
1, (s ji ,s
j′
i′ ) ∈ ω∗
0, else
Then, ω∗ ∈ BR(pD).
Proof. Let pA be any adversary policy, and let Ω denote the set
of paths that are chosen by the policy with nonzero probability
such that the termination of the path is at some destination in
D = ∪Mj=1D j. The utility of the adversary can be written as
UA = ∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)(p(ω)β Aj(ω)+(1− p(ω))αA)
=
M
∑
j=1
∑
d jb∈D j
∑
ω∈Ω
d jb
pi(ω)(p(ω)β Aj +(1− p(ω))αA,
where j(ω) is equal to the stage where the path terminates
and pi(ω) is the probability that the path is chosen under this
policy. The utility UA is then bounded above by the path that
maximizes p(ω)(β Aj −αA), which is exactly the path ω∗.
Using Lemma 5.1, we present the following approach to
select a best response to the adversary for a given defender
policy. For each destination in
⋃M
j=1D j, we first choose a path
ω to that destination such that the probability of reaching that
destination, p(ω), is maximized while traversing destinations
of all intermediate stages. From those paths, we then select a
path that maximizes p(ω)(β Aj −αA).
Proposition 5.2. The path ω∗ returned by a shortest path
algorithm on the state space graph with edge weights of each
incoming edge to states that correspond to node si equal to(
p1D(si)p2D(si)∏2+Nr=3 p
r
D(si)
)
is a best response to the defender
strategy pD.
Proof. Consider a path ω ∈Ωd jb , i.e., a path that originate at
(s0,0, . . . ,0) and terminate at some state that correspond to
node d jb. Let the first node, that belongs to the vulnerable set
λ , through which ω traverse be denoted by λω . Then for all
nodes of G that lie in ω , i.e., si ∈ω , let Λω(si) denote the set
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of indices of the security rules in Λ that are based on si and
the pair (λω ,si).
By Lemma 5.1, it suffices to show that a shortest path in the
state space with a suitably defined weight function will return
a path with maximum probability of reaching some state in
S¯ corresponding to node d jb of G without getting detected by
the adversary. For any path ω ∈Ωd jb , the probability that the
flow reaches d jb without getting detected by the adversary is
equal to ∏si∈ω
(
1−p1D(si)p2D(si)∏2+Nr=3 prD(si)
)
.
max ∏
si∈ω
(
1−p1D(si)p2D(si)
2+N
∏
r=3
prD(si)
)
= max ∑
si∈ω
log
(
1−p1D(si)p2D(si)
2+N
∏
r=3
prD(si)
)
= min ∑
si∈ω
(
p1D(si)p
2
D(si)
2+N
∏
r=3
prD(si)
)
The problem of finding best response to the adver-
sary is equivalent to finding the shortest path from s0
to d jb in a graph where the edge weights are equal to(
p1D(si)p2D(si)∏2+Nr=3 p
r
D(si)
)
for each edge incoming to s j
′
i , for
j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
B. Best Response for the Defender
We now present an approach for approximating the best
response of the defender. In this approach, the set of possible
responses at si is discretized. Define
Vr = {szri : si ∈ S ,zr = 1, . . . ,Zr}
for integers Zr > 0, where r = 1, . . . ,2+N. For any V ′r ⊆ Vr,
r = 1, . . . ,2+N, define pD(si;V ′r ) = 1Zr |{s
zr
i : zr = 1, . . . ,Zr}∩
V ′r |, and define pD(V ′1) to be the resulting vector of prob-
abilities for tag source selection, pD(V ′2) to be the re-
sulting vector of probabilities for tag sink selection, and
pD(V ′3), . . . , pD(V
′
2+N) to be the resulting vectors of probabili-
ties for security rule selection. Then pD(V ′) = {pD(V ′r )}2+Nr=1 }
is the resulting vector of defender strategy, where V ′ =
{V ′1, . . . ,V ′2+N}. For a given adversary strategy, say pA, let
f (V ′) =UD(pD(V ′), pA).
Proposition 5.3. The function f (V ′) is submodular as a
function of V ′, that is, for any V ′r , V ′′r with V ′r ⊆V ′′r and any
szri /∈V ′′r , for r ∈ {1, . . . ,2+N},
f
({
V ′r ∪{szri }
}2+N
r=1
)
− f (V ′)≥ f
({
V
′′
r ∪{szri }
}2+N
r=1
)
− f (V ′′).
Proof. Consider UD as defined in Eq. (1). The first and second
terms of UD are equal to
∑
si∈S
CD(si)
Z1
|{sz1i : z1 = 1, . . . ,Z1}∩V ′1| and
∑
si∈S
WD(si)
Z2
|{sz2i : z2 = 1, . . . ,Z2}∩V ′2|,
respectively, both of which are modular as a function of V ′.
The third term of UD equals
∑
si∈S
N
∑
r=1
γr
Z2+r
|{sz2+ri : z2+r = 1, . . . ,Z2+r}∩V ′2+r|,
which is also modular as a function of V ′. The last term can
be written as
∑
ω
pi(ω)
M
∑
j=1
(pT ( j;ω)αD + pR( j;ω)βDj ),
where pT ( j;ω) (resp. pR( j;ω)) denotes the probability that
the adversarial flow is detected by the defender at the jth
stage (resp. reaches some destination in stage j) when the
sample path is ω and the defender strategy is pD(V ′) (the V ′
is omitted from the notation for simplicity). pi(ω) denotes the
probability of selecting the path ω . Since the last destination
that is reached before dropping out is determined by the choice
of path (denote this destination j(ω)), we have
M
∑
j=1
(pT ( j;ω)αD+pR( j;ω)βDj )=g(ω;V
′)αD+(1−g(ω;V ′))βDj(ω)
= g(ω;V ′)(αD−βDj(ω))+βDj(ω).
Since αD−βDj(ω) ≥ 0 and βDj(ω) is independent of pD(V ′), it
suffices to show that g(ω;V ′) is submodular as a function
of V ′. Let V ′ ⊆ V ′′ with V ′r ⊆ V ′′r and szri /∈ V ′′r , for any r ∈
{1, . . . ,2+N}. We can write g(ω;V ′′)
= 1−
∏
sik
∈ω:
ik=i
(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(sik))

∏
sik
∈ω:
ik 6=i
(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(sik))

= 1−δ (V ′′)(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(si))
c(si;ω),
where prD(sik), for r = 1, . . . ,2+N, denotes the probabilities
of selecting node sik as tag source, as tag sink, and selecting
security rules under the policy pD(V ′), respectively, and
δ (V ′′)= ∏
sik
∈ω:
ik 6=i
(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(sik)), c(si;ω)= |{sik ∈ω : ik = i}|.
Hence, g(ω;
{
V ′′r ∪{szri }
}2+N
r=1
)−g(ω;V ′′)
= 1−δ (V ′′)(1−∏2+Nr=1 (prD(si;V ′′)+ 1Zr ))c(si;ω)−
(1−δ (V ′′)(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(si;V
′′))c(si;ω))
= δ (V ′′)
[
(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(si;V
′′))c(si;ω)−
(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
(prD(si;V
′′)− 1
Zr
))c(si;ω)
]
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When V ′r ⊆V ′′r , prD(si;V ′)≤ prD(si;V ′′), and hence
(1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(si;V
′′))c(si;ω)− (1−
2+N
∏
r=1
(prD(si;V
′′)− 1
Zr
))c(si;ω)
≤ (1−
2+N
∏
r=1
prD(si;V
′))c(si;ω)− (1−
2+N
∏
r=1
(prD(si;V
′)− 1
Zr
))c(si;ω).
Furthermore, V ′r ⊆V ′′r for r = {1, . . . ,2+N} implies δ (V ′)≥
δ (V ′′). Hence
g(ω;
{
V ′r ∪{szri }
}2+N
r=1
)−g(ω;V ′)
> g(ω;
{
V ′′r ∪{szri }
}2+N
r=1
)−g(ω;V ′′),
completing the proof of submodularity.
Submodularity of f (V ′) implies the following.
Proposition 5.4. There exists an algorithm that is guaranteed
to select a set V ? satisfying f (V ?) ≥ 12 max{ f (V ′) : V ′ ⊆V}
within O(NZ) evaluations of UD.
Proof. The proof follows from submodularity of V ′ and [21].
6. RESULTS: SOLUTION TO FLOW TRACKING GAME FOR
SINGLE-STAGE ATTACKS
In this section, we focus on the case where there is only a
single attack stage and provide a solution for the DIFT game.
Recall that in single-stage attack, the attacker’s objective is
to choose transitions in the information flow graph so as
to reach a target node. Our approach to solve the game is
based on a minimum capacity cut-set formulation on a flow
network constructed for the information flow graph of the
system followed by solving a bimatrix game. Here, M = 1
and hence we drop the notation for stage in this section.
For a flow-network F , a cut is defined below.
Definition 6.1. In a flow-network F with vertex and directed
edge sets VF and EF respectively, for a subset Sˆ ⊂VF the cut
induced by Sˆ is a subset of edges κ(Sˆ) ⊂ EF such that for
every (u,v) ∈ κ(Sˆ), |{u,v}∩ Sˆ |= 1.
The set κ(Sˆ) consists of all edges whose one end point
is in Sˆ . Given a flow-network F = (VF ,EF) with source-sink
pair (sF , tF) and edge capacity vector cF : EF → R+, the cost
of a cut κ(Sˆ), is defined as the sum of the costs of the edges
in the cut
cF(κ(Sˆ)) = ∑
e∈κ(Sˆ)
cF(e). (9)
The objective of the (source-sink)-min-cut problem is to find
a cut κ(Sˆ?) of Sˆ? such that cF(κ(Sˆ?)) 6 cF(κ(Sˆ)) for any
cut κ(Sˆ) of Sˆ satisfying sF ∈ Sˆ and tF /∈ Sˆ . The (source-
sink)-min-cut problem is well studied and there exist different
algorithms that find the maximum flow f ? in polynomial time
(polynomial in |VF | and |EF |) [22]. Given an information flow
graph G, we first construct the flow-network F .
Pseudo-code describing the construction of F = (VF ,EF)
is given in Algorithm 6.1. The vertex set of F consists
Algorithm 6.1 Pseudo-code for constructing the flow-network
F and defender payoff function UD(·)
Input: Information flow graph G, costs CD,WD,γ1, . . . ,γN
Output: Flow-network F , source, sink nodes: sF , tF , capac-
ity vector cF
1: Construct flow-network F with vertex set VF and edge
set EF as follows:
2: VF ← VG ∪V ′G ∪ {sF , tF}, where VG = {s1, . . . ,sN}, V ′G =
{s′1, . . . ,s′N}, and sF = s0
3: EF ← E¯G ∪ EˆG ∪Eλ ∪ED, where E¯G = {(s′i,s j) : (si,s j) ∈
EG}, EˆG = {(si,s′i) : i = 1, . . . ,N}, Eλ = {(sF ,si) : si ∈ λ ,
and ED = {(s′i, tF) : si ∈D}
4: cF(e)←
{
∞, e ∈ E¯G ∪Eλ ∪ED
CD(si)+WD(si), e ∈ EˆG
of two nodes si and s′i corresponding to each node si in
the information flow graph G and additional vertices sF , tF
(Step 2). Thus |VF | = 2N + 2. The directed edge set of F
consists of all edges in the information flow graph (E¯G ), edges
corresponding to the nodes in the information flow graph (EˆG ),
edges connecting source node sF to all nodes in the set λ
(Eλ ), and edges connecting all destination nodes to the sink
node tF (ED) (Step 3). The capacity vector cF is defined in
such a way that all edges except the edges corresponding to
nodes in G have infinite capacity. The capacity of the edges
in EˆG are defined as the sum of cost for selecting those nodes
as tag source and tag sink, since the costs of selecting the
security rules do not depend on the node (Step 4). Hence, a
minimum capacity edge in F corresponds to a node in G that
has minimum cost of tagging and trapping. Let κ(Sˆ?) denotes
an optimal solution to the (source-sink)-min-cut problem on
F . Since EˆG is a cut and ∑e∈EˆG cF(e)<∞, κ(Sˆ?)⊂ EˆG Then,
the min-cut nodes is given by
Sˆ? := {si : (si,s′i) ∈ κ(Sˆ?)}. (10)
The objective of the defender is to optimally select a defense
policy such that no adversarial flow reaches from s0 to some
node in D. In other words, defender ensures that no flow from
sF reaches tF without getting detected. For achieving this the
defender’s policy must have a nonzero probability of tag and
trap for at least one node in all possible paths from sF to
tF . For any adversary policy, the best possible choice for the
defender is to tag and trap at a node that has the minimum
total cost CD(·)+WD(·). An attack path is a directed path from
s0 to some node in D formed by a sequence of transitions
of the adversary. The probability of an attack path under an
adversary strategy is the product of the probabilities of all
transitions along that path. The adversary plans its transitions
to obtain an attack path with least probability of detection. The
result below characterizes Nash equilibria of the single-stage.
Theorem 6.2. Let Sˆ? be a min-cut of the flow-network
F = (VF ,EF) constructed in Algorithm 6.1. Then, at Nash
equilibrium for the single-stage attack case, the defender’s
policy is to tag and trap with equal probability all the nodes in
xSˆ?. Further, the adversary’s strategy is such that each attack
path passes through exactly one node in Sˆ?.
Before giving the proof of Theorem 6.2, we present the
following lemma that establishes the first main argument in
proving the theorem.
Lemma 6.3. Let ΩD be the set of all paths in G from s0
to some node in D under any adversary policy. Then, for a
defender policy that assign tag and trap at all nodes in the
min-cut Sˆ? and does not tag and trap any other node, the best
response of the adversary is a sequence of transitions such
that any attack path (or set of paths if mixed policy) passes
through exactly one node which is tagged and also a trap.
Proof. Consider a policy of the defender where all the nodes
in the min-cut, i.e., Sˆ?, are tagged and assigned as traps.
Note that, all paths in ΩD passes through some node in Sˆ?.
We prove the argument through a contradiction. Suppose that
there exists a path ω ∈ ΩD such that there are two nodes,
say si,sr, in path ω with nonzero probability of tag and trap.
Without loss of generality, assume that in ω there exists a
directed path from si to sr. Now we show that pi(ω)= 0, where
pi(ω) is the probability with which adversary chooses path ω .
Note that si,sr ∈ Sˆ?. Since Sˆ? corresponds to a min-cut, there
exists paths in ΩD that has node si in it but not sr, and vice-
versa. Hence for an adversary whose current state is si, there
exists a path from si to some node in D that guarantees the
win of adversary. The transition probability from si to a node
in ω that will lead to some node in D through sr is zero as
this path has lower adversary payoff. This gives pi(ω) = 0 and
completes the proof.
The following result proves that, for any adversary policy
the best response of the defender is to tag and trap at one
node in every attack path under that adversary policy.
Lemma 6.4. Let ΩD denote the set of all paths from s0 to
some node in D under any adversary policy. If the defender’s
policy is such that the probability of detecting the adversary
is the same for all ω ∈ ΩD , then the best response of the
defender is always to tag at exactly one node in every ω ∈ΩD .
Proof. Given (1− p(ω))’s are same for all ω ∈ΩD . Consider
a defender’s policy pD in which exactly one node in every
ω ∈ΩD is chosen as the tag source and tag sink. Assume that
the defender policy is modified to p′D such that more than one
node in some path has nonzero tag and trap probability. This
variation updates the probabilities of nodes in a set of paths
in ΩD . For p′D to be a best response, UD(p′D,pA)>UD(pD,pA).
The defender’s payoff is given by
UD(pD,pA) = ∑
ω∈ΩD
pi(ω)
[
(1− p(ω))αD + p(ω)βD+
∑
si∈ω
[p1D(si)CD(si)+p2D(si)WD(si)+
N
∑
r=1
p2+rD (si)γr]
]
The terms in UD that correspond to αD and βD are the same
in both the cases as p(ω)’s are equal for all possible paths.
Hence the terms in UD differ in the terms corresponding to
CD, WD, and γr’s. Note that defender’s probabilities (policy)
at two nodes in a path are dependent due to the constraint
on p(ω). Hence for every path whose probabilities are mod-
ified, ∑si∈ω [p
′1
D (si)CD(si) + p′2D (si)WD(si) +∑Nr=1 p
′r
D (si)γr] <
∑si∈ω [p
1
D(si)CD(si) + p2D(si)WD(si) + ∑Nr=1 prD(si)γr], as the
probability in the single node case is less than the sum of
the probabilities of more than one node case as the events
are dependent and the CD and WD values are also the least
possible (γr’s are equal at all nodes in the information flow
graph). This implies UD(p′D,pA)<UD(pD,pA). Therefore, there
exists no best response for the defender which has more than
one node with nonzero tag and trap probability in a path, if
p(ω)’s are equal for all ω ∈ΩD .
The result below deduces a property of the best response
of the adversary which along with Lemma 6.4 establishes the
final main argument to prove Theorem 6.2.
Lemma 6.5. Let ΩD denote the set of all paths from s0
to some node in D under any adversarial policy. Let the
defender’s policy is such that the probability of detecting the
adversary is the same for all ω ∈ΩD . Then the best response
of the defender is to tag and trap the flows at the min-cut of
the flow-network F constructed in Algorithm 6.1.
Proof. By Lemma 6.4 the best response of the defender
is to tag and trap at one node in every attack path. Note
that all attack paths chosen under pA passes though some
node in the min-cut. Assigning nonzero probability of tag
and trap at the nodes in Sˆ?, all possible attack paths have
some nonzero probability of getting detected. We prove the
result using a contradiction argument. Suppose that it is
not the best response of the defender to tag and trap the
nodes in Sˆ?. Then, there exists a subset of nodes Sˆ ⊂ S
such that ∑si∈Sˆ CD(si)+WD(si)<∑sr∈Sˆ? CD(sr)+WD(sr) and
all possible paths from s0 to nodes in D pass through
some node in Sˆ . Then, Sˆ is a (source-sink)-cut-set and
let κ(Sˆ) := {(si,s′i) : si ∈ Sˆ}. Then, κ(Sˆ) is a cut set and
cF(κ(Sˆ)) < cF(κ(Sˆ?)). This contradicts the fact that κ(Sˆ?)
is an optimal solution to the (source-sink)-min-cut problem.
Hence the best response of the defender is to tag and trap
only the nodes in Sˆ?.
Now we present the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Proof of Theorem 6.2: Lemma 6.3 proves that the best
response of the adversary is any sequence of transitions that
gives a path (or set of paths if mixed policy) that passes
through exactly one node that is a tag source and a trap, if the
defender’s policy is to tag at the min-cut nodes. Lemma 6.5
concludes that the best response of the defender is to tag and
trap the adversary at the nodes in the min-cut of the flow-
network F , provided the probability of detecting the adversary
in all ω ∈ ΩD are equal. This implies that, if the detection
probability ((1− p(ω))’s) are equal at NE, then the defender’s
policy at NE will tag and trap the nodes in the min-cut and
the adversary will choose an attack path such that it passes
through exactly one node that is tagged and also a trap. Now
we show that the detection probability are indeed equal at NE.
Consider any unilateral deviation in the policy of the
adversary. Let pi(ω)’s for ω ∈Ω are modified due to change
in transition probabilities of the adversary such that the
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updated probabilities of the attack paths are pi(ωi)+ εi, for
i = 1, . . . , |Ω|. Here, εi’s can take positive values, negative
values or zero such that ∑|Ω|i=1 εi = 0. Consider two arbitrary
paths, say ω1 and ω2, such that a unilateral change in the
adversary policy changes pi(ω1) and pi(ω2) and the proba-
bilities of the other paths remain unchanged. Without loss
of generality, assume that pi(ω1) increases by ε while pi(ω2)
decreases by ε and all other pi(ω)’s remain same. As (pD,pA)
is a Nash equilibrium (pi(ω1)+ ε)
(
p(ω1)(β A−αA)+αA
)
+
(pi(ω2)− ε)
(
p(ω2)(β A − αA) + αA
)
6 pi(ω1)
(
p(ω1)(β A −
αA) + αA
)
+ pi(ω2)
(
p(ω2)(β A − αA) + αA
)
. This implies
(p(ω1)− p(ω2))(β A−αA)6 0. As (β A−αA)> 0, this implies
(p(ω1)− p(ω2)) 6 0. By exchanging the roles of ω1 and
ω2 and using the same argument one can also show that
(p(ω1)− p(ω2))> 0. This implies (p(ω1)− p(ω2)) = 0. Since
ω1 and ω2 are arbitrary, one can show that for the general case
|Ω|
∑
i=1
εi p(ωi) = 0. (11)
Eq. (11) should hold for all possible values of εi’s satisfying
∑|Ω|i=1 εi = 0. This gives p(ωi) = p(ω j) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ω|}
at Nash equilibrium. This completes the proof.
The NE of the game is characterized by a solution of the
min-cut problem and the set of transitions of the adversary
such that all attack paths have exactly one node which is
tagged and also a trap. Moreover, the tag and trap probability
of these nodes are equal. Note that, the solution to the min-cut
problem is not unique in a general flow graph and hence the
NE of the game may not be unique. Results in this subsection
conclude that at any NE the defender’s policy will tag and trap
the nodes in the min-cut with equal detection probability and
the adversary chooses its transitions such that in every attack
path exactly one node is a tag source and a tag sink.
A. Matrix Game Analysis for Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, we discuss the matrix-game formulation
of the single-stage case give in Table II. We first solve the
(source-sink)-min-cut problem on F . Let an optimal solution
be κ(Sˆ?). Let the vertex set corresponding to κ(Sˆ?) be
Sˆ? = {sˆ1, . . . , sˆa}, where Sˆ? := {si : (si,s′i) ∈ κ(Sˆ?)}. By
Theorem 6.2, at NE the defender only tag and trap the nodes
in Sˆ? and adversary chooses transitions such that it passes
through only one tag and trap. The attack paths chosen by
the adversary are therefore characterized by {sˆ1, . . . , sˆa}. We
denote the probability of selecting an attack path correspond-
ing to the node sˆi as pi(sˆi). Further, let cost(sˆi) denote the total
cost of selecting node sˆi for conducting security analysis.
Remark 6.6. At NE, since any attack path pass through
exactly one node in Sˆ? = {sˆ1, . . . , sˆa} which indeed has equal
probability of tag and trap, without loss of generality, one
can consider the action space of the adversary as the set of
disjoint paths through Sˆ? and the adversary strategize over
this set of disjoint paths. Thus in the bimatrix formulation, the
strategy of the adversary is to select a path which is uniquely
defined by a node in Sˆ?.
Now, we present a result that characterizes the set of NE of
the single-stage attack case of the game given in Section 3.
Theorem 6.7. Solution to the matrix-game given in Table II
gives Nash equilibrium for the single-stage flow tracking
game.
Proof. The defender’s payoffs for the two cases in Table II is
UD(Not detected) =
a
∑
i=1
pi(sˆi)
(
βD
)
(12)
UD(Detected) =
a
∑
i=1
pi(sˆi)
(
αD + cost(sˆi)
)
(13)
If UD(Not detected) > UD(Detected), then the defender will
never tag and trap at any node and the adversary will reach
the destination without getting detected by the defender. On
the other hand, if UD(Detected)>UD(Not detected), then the
adversary will always tag and trap all the nodes in Sˆ? with
probability one. The defender will randomly choose between
to detect the adversary or not if Eqs. (12) and (13) are equal.
This gives
a
∑
i=1
pi(sˆi)
(
βD−αD− cost(sˆi)
)
= 0. (14)
There are many possible values of pi(sˆi)’s for i= 1, . . . ,a, that
satisfy Eq. (14). Each of those solution will give a probability
mixture, i.e., pi(sˆi)’s, for the adversary at a Nash equilibrium.
In order to obtain the probability mixture of the defender,
we consider the following in Table II. For every sˆi ∈ Sˆ?,
one can find the set of nodes that belong to the set λ
that has directed path to the node sˆi using a depth first
search (DFS) algorithm [23]. Let this set be denoted by
λ (sˆi). Then, cost(sˆi) = CD(sˆi) +WD(sˆi) +∑r∈λ (sˆi) γr for all
sˆi ∈ Sˆ?. Then the probability of not detecting the adversary
in an attack path with min-cut node sˆi in it is given by
(1−p1D(sˆi)p2D(sˆi)∏r∈λ (sˆi)p2+rD (sˆi)).
UA(sˆ1) =
(
1−p1D(sˆ1)p2D(sˆ1) ∏
r∈λ (sˆ1)
p2+rD (sˆ1)
)
β A +
p1D(sˆ1)p
2
D(sˆ1) ∏
r∈λ (sˆ1)
p2+rD (sˆ1)α
A (15)
UA(sˆ2) =
(
1−p1D(sˆ2)p2D(sˆ2) ∏
r∈λ (sˆ2)
p2+rD (sˆ2)
)
β A +
p1D(sˆ1)p
2
D(sˆ1) ∏
r∈λ (sˆ2)
p2+rD (sˆ2)α
A (16)
...
...
UA(sˆa) =
(
1−p1D(sˆa)p2D(sˆa) ∏
r∈λ (sˆa)
p2+rD (sˆa)
)
β A +
p1D(sˆ1)p
2
D(sˆ1) ∏
r∈λ (sˆa)
p2+rD (sˆa)α
A (17)
If the adversary’s payoff with respect to one of the node
in Sˆ? is greater than the rest, then the adversary will always
select the attack path with respect to that node. The adversary
will randomly choose between attack paths that correspond to
nodes sˆ1, sˆ2, . . . , sˆa only when UA(sˆ1) =UA(sˆ2) = . . .=UA(sˆa)
which means Eqs. (15) to (17) must be equal. Theorem 6.2
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Table II: Matrix game for single-stage case with disjoint attack paths
p(ω)
1− p(ω)
Defender
Adversary
sˆ1 sˆ2 . . . sˆa
Not detected (βD,β A) (βD,β A) . . . (βD,β A)
Detected (αD + cost(sˆ1),αA) (αD + cost(sˆ2),αA) . . . (αD + cost(sˆa),αA)
says that p(ω) = (1−p1D(sˆ1)p2D(sˆ1)∏r∈λ (sˆ1)p2+rD (sˆ1)) = . . .=
(1− p1D(sˆa)p2D(sˆa)∏r∈λ (sˆa)p2+rD (sˆa)). Thus Eqs. (15) to (17)
are the same.
The defender’s payoff is given by
UD(pD,pA) = ∑
ω∈Ω
pi(ω)
[
(1− p(ω))αD + p(ω)βD+
∑
si∈ω
[p1D(si)CD(si)+p2D(si)WD(si)+
N
∑
r=1
p2+rD (si)γr]
]
At Nash equilibrium with respect to the solution Sˆ? of
the (source-sink)-min-cut game, changing p2+rD (sˆi) for any
value of r ∈ {1, . . . ,N} and for one node, say sˆi ∈ Sˆ?, will
not improve the payoff UD. Firstly, let us assume that the
tagging probability at sˆi changes from p1D(sˆi) to p′
1
D(sˆi). By
equilibrium condition UD(pD,pA)>UD(p′D,pA). Note that by
Lemma 6.3 each node with nonzero defender’s probability
will lie in exactly one chosen path by the adversary. Hence
pi(sˆi)
[
p(ω)(βD−αD)+αD +p1D(sˆi)CD(sˆi)
]
> pi(sˆi)
[
p′(ω)(βD−αD)+αD +p′1D(sˆi)CD(sˆi)
]
, and
pi(sˆi)
[
(p(ω)− p′(ω))(βD−αD)+(p1D(sˆi)−p′1D(sˆi))CD(sˆi)
]
> 0.
Here
p(ω)− p′(ω) =
(
p2D(sˆi) ∏
r∈λ (sˆi)
p2+rD (sˆi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ1(sˆi)
(
p′1D(sˆi)−p1D(sˆi)
)
.
This gives[
pi(sˆi)
(
ϕ1(sˆi)(βD−αD)−CD(sˆi)
)]
(p′1D(sˆi)−p1D(sˆi))> 0.
The term pi(sˆi)
[
ϕ1(sˆi)(βD−αD)− CD(si)
]
is independent of
the change in the tagging probability at sˆi and the value is
either positive or negative. By the equilibrium assumption,
pi(sˆi)
[
ϕ1(sˆi)(βD−αD)−CD(sˆi)
]
= 0 (since (p′1D(sˆi)−p1D(sˆi))
can be made positive or negative and the inequality must hold
for both cases). As pi(sˆi) 6= 0, this implies
ϕ1(sˆi) =
CD(sˆi)
(βD−αD) .
By varying the tag sink selection probability, i.e., changing
p2D(sˆi) to p′
2
D(sˆi), we get
ϕ2(sˆi)=
WD(sˆi)
(βD−αD) , where ϕ2(sˆi) :=
(
p1D(sˆi) ∏
r∈λ (sˆi)
p2+rD (sˆi)
)
.
Similarly, by varying the probability of selection each of the
rules at sˆi, for r ∈ {1, . . . ,N},
ϕr+2(sˆi) =
γr
(βD−αD) .
Taking logarithms of ϕ1(sˆi), . . . ,ϕ2+N(sˆi), for a node sˆi ∈ S ,
we get 2+N independent linear equations with 2+N un-
knowns. Thus there exists a unique solution to this set of
equations which indeed gives the defender’s policy at Nash
equilibrium. Thus solution to the matrix-game in Table II
gives a NE to the single-stage case.
This completes the discussion on the NE for the flow
tracking game when the attack consists of a single stage. In
the next section, we analyze the equilibrium of multi-stage
attack.
7. RESULTS: SOLUTION TO FLOW TRACKING GAME FOR
MULTI-STAGE ATTACKS
Solving for Nash equilibrium in non-zero sum, imperfect
information game settings is generally known to be compu-
tationally difficult. In this section, we present an efficient
algorithm to compute a locally optimal correlated equilib-
rium [24], [25] of the game introduced in the Section 3.
Formal definitions for the correlated equilibrium and the
local correlated equilibrium are given in the Definitions 4.3
and 4.4, respectively. Intuitively correlated equilibrium can be
viewed as a general distribution over set of strategy profiles
such that if an impartial mediator privately recommends action
to each player from this distribution, then no player has an
incentive to choose a different strategy. The correlated equi-
librium has several advantages [24], [25] : (1) it is guaranteed
to always exist and (2) it can be solved in polynomial time
(i.e. computing a correlated equilibrium only requires solving
a linear program whereas solving a Nash equilibrium requires
finding its fixed point).
In order to find locally optimal correlated equilibrium
solutions, we map our two-player game model into a game
with (M+ 2)N +Λ+ 1 players. Where Λ = ∑Ni=1Λ(si) with
si ∈ VG and Λ(si) stands for the total number of security
rules associated with the node si ∈VG in the information flow
graph. Then the adversary’s strategy is represented by MN+1
players, MN of which represents the adversary’s actions at
every node si ∈VG and for a specified stage j ∈{1, . . . ,M} and
one adversarial player acting on the pseudo node, s0, whose
strategy decides the entry point chosen by the adversary into
the system. Similarly, the defender’s strategy is represented by
∑Ni=1Λ(si)+ 2N players, each one of the Λ(si)+ 2 defender
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player represents the defender’s strategy (tag selection, trap
selection, and selection of security rules) at a single node si.
Formally, we consider a set of players {PAi j : i =
1, . . . ,N, j = 1, . . . ,M}∪ {PDi : i = 1, . . . ,2N +Λ}∪ {Ps0}.
Each of the players in PAi j has action space A Ai j =N (si),
each player in PDi has action space {0,1}, depending on the
type of defender player representing whether or not to tag or
trap/no trap or selecting or not selecting a specific tag check
rule. The playerPs0 has action space λ . We let aD denote the
set of actions chosen by the players {PDi : i= 1, . . . ,2N+Λ}
and aA denote the set of actions chosen by the players
{PAi j : i = 1, . . . ,N, j = 1, . . . ,M}∪{Ps0}.
The payoffs of the players from a particular action set are
given by
UAi j(aA,aD) = UA(aA,aD),
UDi(aA,aD) = UD(aA,aD),
where UA and UD are as defined in Section 3. Hence, all
adversarial players receive the same utility UA, while all
defender players receive the utility UD. Equivalently, the
adversarial players UAi j cooperate in order to maximize the
adversary’s utility, while the defender players UDi attempt to
maximize the defender utility.
Under the solution algorithm, the game is played repeat-
edly, with each player choosing its action from a probability
distribution (mixed strategy) over the set of possible actions.
After observing their utilities, the players update their strate-
gies according to an internal regret minimization learning
algorithm [26]. A pseudo-code of the proposed algorithm for
computing correlated equilibrium strategies for both defender
and adversary players is given in Algorithm 7.1.
Algorithm 7.1 Pseudo-code of the algorithm for computing
correlated equilibrium
1: Initialize t← 0
2: for n = 1, . . . ,(M+2)N+Λ+1 do
3: pt,n← uniform distribution over set of actions
4: end for
5: while ||pt −pt−1||> ε do
6: for n = 1, . . . ,(M+2)N+Λ+1 do
7: at,n← action chosen from distribution pt,n
8: end for
9: for n = 1, . . . ,(M+2)N+Λ+1 do
10: at,−n← (at,l : l 6= n)
11: for all (r,s) actions of player n do
12: pr→st,n ← pt,n
13: pr→st,n (r)← 0
14: pr→st,n (s)← pt,n(r)+pt,n(s)
15: ∆(r,s),t,n← exp(η∑
t−1
u=1 E(U
n(pr→su,n ,au,−n)))
∑(x,y):x 6=y exp(η∑t−1u=1 E(Un(p
x→y
u,n ,au,−n)))
16: pt,n ← fixed point of equation pt,n =
∑(i, j):i6= j pr→st,n ∆(r,s),t,n
17: end for
18: end for
19: t← t+1
20: end while
The algorithm initializes the strategies at each node of
the information flow graph to be uniformly random. At each
iteration t, an action is chosen for each player according to
the probability distribution pt,n of player n. After observing
the actions from other players, the probability distribution
pt,n is updated as follows. For each pair of actions r and s,
the new probability distribution pr→st,n is generated, in which
all of the probability mass allocated to action r is instead
allocated to action s. The expected utility arising from pr→st,n
can be interpreted as the expected benefit from playing action
s instead of r at previous iterations of the algorithm.
For each pair (r,s), a weight ∆(r,s),t,n is computed that
consists of the relative benefit of each distribution pr→st,n ,
i.e., pairs (r,s) such that allocating probability mass from
r to s produces a larger expected utility will receive higher
weight. A new distribution pt,n is then computed based on
the weights ∆(r,s),t,n, so that actions that produced a higher
utility for the player will be chosen with increased probability.
The algorithm continues until the distributions converge. The
convergence of the algorithm is described by the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.1. Algorithm 7.1 converges to a local corre-
lated equilibrium of the game introduced in Section 3.
Proof. By [26], Algorithm 7.1 converges to a correlated
equilibrium of the ((M + 2)N +Λ+ 1)-player game. Equiv-
alently, by Definition 4.3, for any si and p′Di ∈ [0,1], the joint
distribution P returned by the algorithm satisfies
E(UDi(pDi ,pD−i ,pA))≥ E(UDi(p′Di ,pD−i ,pA)). (18)
Since the utility UDi is equal to UD for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}, Eq.
(18) is equivalent to
E(UD(pDi ,pD−i ,pA))≥ E(UD(p′Di ,pD−i ,pA)). (19)
Similarly, for any s ji ∈ {S×{1, . . . ,M}}∪{s10} and any p′Ai j ,
we have
E(UAi j(pD,pA−i j , pAi j))≥ E(UAi j(pD,pA−i j , p′Ai j)) (20)
which is equivalent to
E(UA(pD,pA−i j , pAi j))≥ E(UA(pD,pA−i j , p′Ai j)) (21)
Equations (19) and (21) imply that the output of Algorithm
7.1 satisfies the conditions of Definition 4.4 and hence is a
local correlated equilibrium.
The following Proposition provides the complexity analysis
for the proposed algorithm.
Proposition 7.2. With probability (1 − ζ ), Algorithm
7.1 returns an ε-correlated equilibrium using
O
(
N2(M+2)+N(Λ+1)
ε2 ln
(
N2(M+1)+N(Λ+1)
ζ
))
evaluations of
the utility function.
Proof. By [26, Chapter 7, Section 7.4], learning-based al-
gorithms return an ε-correlated equilibrium with probability
(1− ζ ) within maxn 16ε2 ln NnKζ iterations, where Nn is the
number of actions for player n and K is the number of players,
incurring a total of 16NnKε2 ln
NnK
ζ evaluations of the utility
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function. In this case, Nn ≤ N and K = (M + 2)N +Λ+ 1,
resulting in the desired complexity bounds.
Proposition 7.2 shows that convergence of the algorithm is
sublinear in the number of nodes, with a total complexity that
is quadratic in the number of nodes and linear in the number
of stages.
8. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide the experimental validation
of our model and results using real-world attack data set
obtained using Refinable Attack INvestigation system (RAIN)
[3], [4] for a three day nation state attack. We implement
our model and run Algorithm 7.1 on the information flow
graph generated using the system log data obtained using
the RAIN system for the day one of the nation state attack.
Using the results obtained we verify the correctness of the
proposed algorithm and also perform sensitivity analysis by
varying the cost of defense (i.e., tagging costs, trapping costs
and individual security rule selection costs at each nodes
in the underlying information flow graph) for the defender.
This analysis enable us to infer the optimal strategies of the
players and the sensitivity of the model with respect to cost
parameters for a given attack data set (information flow graph
with specified destinations for each attack stage). In order
to apply the proposed analysis on any real-time data attack
data set, we first construct the information flow graph for the
system under consideration and then run Algorithm 7.1 on this
graph to obtain the defender’s policy, i.e., tagging locations,
trapping locations and selection of appropriate security rules,
at a local equilibrium of the multi-stage game.
We present below the details of the attack we consider and
the steps involved in the construction of the information flow
graph for that attack.
A. Attack Description
The evaluation was completed on a nation state attack
(i.e., state-of-the-art APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) attack)
orchestrated by a red-team during an adversarial engage-
ment. The engagement was organized by a US government
agency (US DARPA). During the engagement, we leveraged
RAIN [3] to record the whole-system log. At a high-level
the goal of the adversaries’ campaign was to steal sensitive
proprietary and personal information from the targeted com-
pany. The attack is designed to run through three days. We
only consider the day one log data collected via RAIN for
our evaluation purposes. Through our extensive analysis, we
partitioned the attack in day 01 into four key stages: initial
compromise, internal reconnaissance, foothold establishment,
and data exfiltration. The initial compromise leveraged a
spear-phishing attack, which lead the victim to a website that
was hosting ads from a malicious web server. The victim
navigated to the website, which exploited a vulnerability in
the Firefox browser. Once the attackers had compromised
the machine, the next stage of the APT leveraged common
utilities to do internal reconnaissance. The goal of this stage
was to fingerprint the compromised system to detect running
processes and network information. Next, the attackers estab-
lished a foothold by writing a malicious program to disk. The
malicious program was eventually executed, and established
a backdoor, which was used to continuously exfiltrate the
companies sensitive data.
The system log data for the day 01 of the nation state
attack is collected with the annotated entry points of the attack
and the attack destinations corresponding to each stage of the
attack. Initial conversion of the attack data into an information
flow graph resulted in a coarse-grain graph with ≈ 1,32,000
nodes and ≈ 2 million edges. Coarse graph captures the
whole system data during the recording time which includes
the attack related data and lots of data related to system’s
background processes (noise). Hence coarse graph provides
very little security sensitive (attack related) information about
the underlying system and it is computationally intensive to
run our algorithm on such coarse graph. Without loss of any
relevant information, now we prune the coarse graph to extract
the security sensitive information about the system from the
data [3]. The resulting information flow graph is called as
security sensitive information sub-graph [3] and we run our
experimental analysis on this graph. The pruning includes the
following two major steps:
1) Starting from the provided attack destinations, perform
up stream, down stream and point to point stream tech-
niques discussed in [3] to prune the coarse information
flow graph
2) Further prune the resulting subgraph from Step 1) by
combining object nodes (e.g. files, net-flow objects) that
belong to the same directories or that use the same
network sockets.
The resulting pruned information flow graph consists of
30 nodes (N = 30) out of which 8 nodes are identified as
attack destination nodes corresponding to each of the 4 stages
(M = 4) of the day 01 nation state attack. One node related
to a net-flow object has been identified as an entry point used
for the attack (|λ | = 1). Note that, even when the sensitive
locations in the system are known it may not be feasible to
do tagging, trapping, and security analysis at that location
(entry point of attack) which is captured in our model by
the costs for tagging, trapping, and performing authenticity
analysis using a security rule.
B. Case Study 1: Convergence of the algorithm
In this section, we provide a case study that validates
the convergence of the proposed algorithm. The game pa-
rameters (rewards, penalties and costs) of the players are
set as follows: βA1 = 100,β
A
2 = 200,β
A
3 = 500,β
A
4 = 1200,
αA = −2000, αD = 2000, βD1 = −100,βD2 = −200,βD3 =
−500,βD4 = −1200. We set costs of tagging and trapping at
each node to have fixed cost value of c1 = −50,c2 = −50,
respectively, multiplied by the fraction of flows through each
node in the information graph and the costs for selecting
security rules as γ1 = . . . = γN = −50. For simulation pur-
poses we assume fraction of the flows through each node is
uniformly distributed. One can estimate the distribution for
the fraction of flows through each node by counting number
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Figure 1: (a) Average utility of the defender and (b) Average utility of the adversary, at each iteration of Algorithm 7.1 with cost
parameters of the game set as follows: βA1 = 100,β
A
2 = 200,β
A
3 = 500,β
A
4 = 1200, α
A =−2000,αD = 2000, βD1 =−100,βD2 =
−200,βD3 =−500,βD4 =−1200. The costs of tagging and trapping at each node are set with fixed cost value of c1 =−50 and
c2 =−50, respectively, multiplied by the fraction of flows through each node in the information graph. The cost of selecting
the security rules are set as γ1 = . . . = γN = −50. For simulation purposes we assume that the fraction of the flows through
each node in the information flow graph is uniform.
Figure 2: Security sensitive information flow sub-graph for
the nation state attack
of events associated with each node in the RAIN whole
system provenance and normalizing those values with the total
number of events occurred during the recording. Figure 1
plots the utility values for both players at each iteration of
Algorithm 7.1 for the above-mentioned parameters. It shows
that both defender and adversary utilities converges within
finite number of iterations.
C. Case Study 2: Utility of the defender vs. defense cost
This case study is used to analyze the effect of the cost
of defense on the defender’s utility. We use same game
parameters as used in the Case Study 8-B. Then at each
experiment round we scale all three defense cost components
of the defender by scaling factors 0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 3, 6 and 10.
Figure 3 shows that the expected utility of the defender starts
decreasing exponentially when the cost of defense increases
to higher values. When the defense cost increases defender
incurs more resource cost to maintain the same level of
security (maintain low attack success probability by setting
up tag sources and traps) in the system or higher costs keeps
defender away from frequently deploying tag sources and
traps in the system and hence attack successes rate increases
and defender’s utility decreases. This results hence implies
that an optimal selection of the locations for tagging and
trapping is critical for a resource-efficient implementation of
detection system against APTs.
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Figure 3: Average utility of defender as a function of the cost
for defense. In each realization of the experiment we scale the
components of the cost for defense (i.e. costs for tag, trap and
tag check rule selection) by a increasing scaler factors 0.01,
0.1, 0.5, 1, 3, 6 and 10. All the other game parameters have
been fixed to constant values used in the Case Study 8-B.
9. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposed a game theoretic framework for cost-
effective real-time detection of Advanced Persistent Threats
xvi
(APTs) that perform a multi-stage attack. We used an in-
formation flow tracking-based detection mechanism as APTs
continuously introduce information flows in the system. As
the defense mechanism is unaware of the stage of the attack
and also can not distinguish whether an information flow
is malicious or not, the game considered in this paper has
asymmetric information structure. Further, the resource costs
of the attacker and the defender are not same resulting in
a multi-stage nonzero-sum imperfect information game. We
first computed the best responses of both the players. For the
adversary, we showed that the best response can be obtained
using a shortest path algorithm in polynomial time. For the
defender, we showed that the utility function of the defender
is submodular for a given adversary strategy and hence a
1/2-optimal1 solution to the best response can be found in
polynomial time. For solving the game in order to obtain
an optimal policy for the defender, we first considered the
single-stage attack case and characterized the set of Nash
equilibria by proving the equivalence of the sequential game
to a bimatrix-game formulation. Then, we considered the
multi-stage case and provided a polynomial time algorithm
to find an ε-correlated equilibrium, for any given ε . We
performed experimental analysis of our model on real-data
for a three day nation state attack obtained using Refinable
Attack INvestigation (RAIN) system.
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